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Game theoretic aspects of distributed spectral
coordination with application to DSL networks
Amir Laufer1,2, Amir Leshem1 and Hagit Messer2
Abstract
In this paper we use game theoretic techniques to study the value of cooperation in distributed spectrum
management problems. We show that the celebrated iterative water-filling algorithm is subject to the prisoner’s
dilemma and therefore can lead to severe degradation of the achievable rate region in an interference channel
environment. We also provide thorough analysis of a simple two bands near-far situation where we are able to
provide closed form tight bounds on the rate region of both fixed margin iterative water filling (FM-IWF) and
dynamic frequency division multiplexing (DFDM) methods. This is the only case where such analytic expressions
are known and all previous studies included only simulated results of the rate region. We then propose an alternative
algorithm that alleviates some of the drawbacks of the IWF algorithm in near-far scenarios relevant to DSL access
networks. We also provide experimental analysis based on measured DSL channels of both algorithms as well as
the centralized optimum spectrum management.
Keywords: Spectrum optimization, DSL, distributed coordination, game theory, interference channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have shown great advances in digital subscriber line (DSL) spectrum management. The public
telephone copper lines network is limited by crosstalk between lines. As such dynamic management of the lines
based on the actual crosstalk channels is becoming an important ingredient in enhancing the overall network
performance at the physical layer. In a series of papers [13] [11], [8], [9] (and the references therein) Cioffi and
his group defined several levels of spectral coordination for DSL access networks, where level zero coordination
corresponds to no coordination, level one corresponds to distributed spectrum coordination, level two is centralized
spectrum management where all spectral allocations are performed by a single spectrum management center (SMC).
The third level is actually joint transmission / reception of all lines. To perform level three all signals are vectored into
a single vectored signal. DSM level three can be divided into two types of vectoring: Two sided coordination (where
all lines are both jointly encoded and jointly decoded) and single sided coordination where a central processing unit
at the network side of the lines jointly encodes all the downstream transmission or jointly decodes the upstream
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2transmissions. Two sided coordination is typical to private networks, and is implemented e.g., in gigabit Ethernet and
the future 10 Gb Ethernet over copper. Single sided level three coordination is more relevant to public DSL networks
where different lines are terminated at different customer houses. However joint transmission over all lines in a
binder is still computationally complicated to implement due to several factors. First equipment already deployed
uses the single input single output approach, where each line is operated independently assuming interference
from other lines to be part of the background noise. Second the unbundling of the copper infrastructure and the
deployment of remote terminals makes joint transmission impossible in certain scenarios. It is anticipated that fiber
to the basement and fiber to the neighborhood architecture will benefit greatly from level three coordination, while
legacy DSL deployment will not be enhanced by these techniques. On the other hand dynamic spectrum management
(DSM) levels 1-2 only the power spectral density is optimized to enhance overall network performance is still an
important tool for increasing the reach and improving the service of legacy long loops. The major difference between
DSM level 1 and level 2 is the existence of a central spectrum management center performing the optimization
jointly at level 2, while DSM level 1 requires distributed coordination of the lines, where each modem performs
its optimization independently of the other lines. The most appealing property of level 1 coordination is the fact
that it can be implemented using firmware upgrades to existing DSL modems (which already have a built in power
spectral density (PSD) shaping capability), rather than complete replacement of infrastructure.
The basic approach to distributed coordination has been proposed in [8]. In this approach each modem is using
the iterative waterfilling (IWF) algorithm to optimize its own spectrum. The modem iteratively optimizes its own
transmit PSD against the actual noise caused by other modems in the binder. All modems repeat this process until
convergence is achieved. There are three basic versions of the IWF algorithm [1]: Rate Adaptive (RA) where the
modem uses all the power to maximize the rate, Margin Adaptive (MA) where excessive power is used to increase
the margin and Fixed Margin (FM) where the modem minimizes the transmit power subject to a fixed margin and
fixed rate constraint. This is done by reducing the power whenever the margin achieved is higher than required.
This approach leads to great improvement over the totally selfish strategies of RA-IWF and MA-IWF. However as
we shall demonstrate, large improvements can be achieved when the modems use a-priori agreed upon cooperative
strategy.
Distributed coordination is basically a situation of conflict between the users. Each user would like to improve its
rate even at the expense of other users. To gain some insight into the problem we apply game theoretic techniques.
The distributed spectrum management process can be viewed as a game which is called the interference game [8].
In this game each user has a pay-off function given by its rate, and its strategies are basically choice of PSD. A fixed
point of the IWF process is a Nash equilibrium in the interference game. However Nash equilibrium points can
be highly suboptimal due to the well known Prisoner’s dilemma [7]. This suggests that defining a new cooperative
game where players can commit to follow certain strategies will improve not only the overall network capacity,
but also the individual user capacity (The payoff in the interference game is the achievable rate or capacity). A
simple case of the interference game is the two users game. While this game is rather simplistic it captures well
3the interference environment between two groups of users: One group served from central office (CO) using legacy
equipment such as ADSL or ADSL2+, and a second group served from a remote terminal (RT) over shorter lines
and more modern equipment such as VDSL2 modems. It can also model well the case of two remote terminals of
different service providers sharing customers in the same binder. These two cases are of great interest from practical
point of view. Both cases influence the possible regulation of spectrum in an unbundled binder. Furthermore the
case of remote terminals is crucial for maintaining legacy service integrity while expanding the network with remote
terminals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II formalizes the distributed spectrum coordination for
Gaussian interference channel in terms of game theory. It is followed by Section III, in which the occurrence of
the prisoner’s dilemma for a simplified symmetric two players game is analyzed. Section IV is devoted to the
application of the previous results to the near-far problem in DSL channels. It provides analytic expression for the
region where frequency division multiplexing will improve the rate region over the competitive IWF algorithm. In
Section V we propose a simple dynamic frequency domain multiplexing (DFDM) scheme that can outperform the
IWF in these cases. The results are also demonstrated on measured VDSL channels provided by France Telecom
research labs (Section VI).
II. THE GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE GAME
In this section we define the Gaussian interference game, and provide some simplifications for dealing with
discrete frequencies. For a general background on non-cooperative games we refer the reader to [7] and [6].
The Gaussian interference game was defined in [8]. In this paper we use the discrete approximation game. Let
f0 < · · · < fK be an increasing sequence of frequencies. Let Ik be the closed interval be given by Ik = [fk−1, fk].
We now define the approximate Gaussian interference game denoted by GI{I1,...,IK}.
Let the players 1, . . . , N operate over separate channels. Assume that the N channels have crosstalk coupling
functions hij(k). Assume that user i’th is allowed to transmit a total power of Pi. Each player can transmit a power
vector pi = (pi(1), . . . , pi(K)) ∈ [0, Pi]
K such that pi(k) is the power transmitted in the interval Ik. Therefore we
have
∑K
k=1 pi(k) = Pi. The equality follows from the fact that in non-cooperative scenario all users will use the
maximal power they can use. This implies that the set of power distributions for all users is a closed convex subset
of the cube
∏N
i=1[0, Pi]
K given by:
B =
N∏
i=1
Bi (1)
where Bi is the set of admissible power distributions for player i is
Bi = [0, Pi]K ∩
{
(p(1), . . . , p(K)) :
K∑
k=1
p(k) = Pi
}
(2)
Each player chooses a PSD pi = 〈pi(k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ N〉 ∈ Bi. Let the payoff for user i be given by:
Ci (p1, . . . ,pN ) =
K∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
|hi(k)|
2pi(k)∑
|hij(k)|2pj(k) + n(k)
)
(3)
4where Ci is the capacity available to player i given power distributions p1, . . . ,pN , channel responses hi(f),
crosstalk coupling functions hij(k) and ni(k) > 0 is external noise present at the i’th channel receiver at frequency
k. In cases where ni(k) = 0 capacities might become infinite using FDM strategies, however this is non-physical
situation due to the receiver noise that is always present, even if small. Each Ci is continuous on all variables.
Definition 2.1: The Gaussian Interference game GI{I1,...,Ik} = {C,B} is the N players non-cooperative game
with payoff vector C =
(
C1, . . . , CN
)
where Ci are defined in (3) and B is the strategy set defined by (1).
The interference game is a special case of non-cooperative N-persons game. An important notion in game theory
is that of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.2: An N -tuple of strategies 〈p1, . . . ,pN 〉 for players 1, . . . , N respectively is called a Nash equi-
librium iff for all n and for all p (p a strategy for player n)
Cn
(
p1, ...,pn−1,p,pn+1, . . . ,pN
)
< Cn (p1, ...,pN )
i.e., given that all other players i 6= n use strategies pi, player n best response is pn.
The proof of existence of Nash equilibrium in the general interference game follows from an easy adaptation of the
proof of the this result for convex games. In appendix A we demonstrate how the continuity of the joint water-filling
strategies is essentially what is needed in order to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in the interference game.
It is an adaptation of the result of [5] as presented in [6]. An alternative proof relying on differentiability has been
given by Chung et.al [3]. A much harder problem is the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points in the water-filling
game. This is very important to the stability of the waterfilling strategies. A first result in this direction has been
given in [2]. A more general analysis of the convergence (although it still does not cover the case of arbitrary
channels has been given in [15].
While Nash equilibria are inevitable whenever non-cooperative zero sum game is played they can lead to
substantial loss to all players, compared to a cooperative strategy in the non-zero sum case. In the next section we
demonstrate this phenomena for a simplified channel model.
III. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA FOR THE 2×2 SYMMETRIC GAME
In order to present the benefits of cooperative strategies for spectral management we first focus on a simplified
two users two frequency bands symmetric game. The channel matrices of this channel are the follows:
|H(1)|2 =

 1 h
h 1

 , |H(2)|2 =

 1 h
h 1

 (4)
where H(1) and H(2) are the normalized channel matrices for each frequency band, and
h = |h12(1)|
2 = |h21(1)|
2 = |h12(2)|
2 = |h21(2)|
2
Since in the DSL environment the crosstalk from other user is smaller than the self channel response (i.e. hij(k) <
hi(k) ∀i, j, k we’ll limit the discussion to 0 ≤ h < 1.
5In this section we analyze the symmetric 2×2 interference game and find the Nash equilibrium which is achieved
by both users using the full spectrum. We then provide full characterization of channel-SNR pairs for which IWF
is optimal as well as full conditions for the two other situations: (in terms of pairs of channel coefficient and SNR)
The first is known as the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and was discovered by Flood and Dresher [16]. The second is
the “chicken” dilemma game, a termed coined by B. Russel in the context of the missile crisis in Cuba [17]. We
will show that in both these cases cooperative strategies (FDM) outperform the Nash equilibrium achieved by the
IWF.
In our symmetric game both users have the same power constraint P and the power allocation matrix is defined
as
P ·

 1− α α
β 1− β

 (5)
The capacity for user I is as follows:
C1 =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
(1 − α) · P
N + β · P · h
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
α · P
N + (1− β) · P · h
)
(6)
where N is the noise power spectral density.
The last equation can be rewritten as -
C1 =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
(1− α)
SNR−1 + β · h
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
α
SNR−1 + (1− β) · h
)
(7)
where SNR = P/N .
By the definition of the Gaussian interference game, the set of strategies in this simplified game is
{α, β : 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1} (8)
Claim 3.1: In the 2× 2 symmetric interference game there is Nash equilibrium point at α = β = 12 .
Proof: An IWF solution for this case will be of the form:
(1 − βi−1)h+ αi = βi−1h+ (1− αi) (9)
(1 − αi−1)h+ βi = αi−1h+ (1− βi) (10)
which implies that
αi =
(2βi−1 − 1)h+ 1
2
(11)
βi =
(2αi−1 − 1)h+ 1
2
(12)
The expression in (9) is the water filling solution for α in the ith iteration of the IWF as a function of β computed
in the (i − 1)th iteration. Similarly (10) is the water filling solution for β in the ith iteration as a function of α
computed in the (i− 1)th iteration. These set of equations will converges when
αi = αi−1 ≡ α (13)
6and
βi = βi−1 ≡ β (14)
substituting (13) and (14) in (11) and (12) and solving the two equations we get
α = β =
1
2
(15)
since the IWF converges to a Nash equilibrium we conclude that α = β = 12 is a Nash equilibrium in this game.
We interpret the IWF as the competitive act, since each user maximizes its rate given the other user power allocation,
we choose FDM as the cooperative way. Applying FDM (which implies that α = β = 0) means causing no
interference to the other user ,by using orthogonal bands for transmission. We want to compare between these two
approaches of power allocation, the competitive one (IWF) and the cooperative one (FDM). Instead of comparing
these approaches on the ”continuous” game (continuous with respect to the set of strategies in the game defined in
(8)), we can discuss and analyze the ”discrete” game, which is characterized by having only two strategies followed
by a set of four different values of α and β. This reduction is allowed since for two strategies and two users there
are four different choices of mutual power allocations:
• both users select FDM resulting in α = β = 0
• user I selects FDM while user II selects IWF resulting in α = 0 , β = 1−h2 (β is the solution of 12 where
α = 0)
• user I selects IWF while user II selects FDM resulting in α = 1−h2 , β = 0 (α is the solution of 11 where
β = 0)
• both users select IWF resulting in α = β = 12 as we have shown in the theorem
Tables I describes the payoffs of users I at four different levels of mutual cooperation (The payoffs of user II are
the same with the inversion of the cooperative/competetive roles).
TABLE I
USER I PAYOFFS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MUTUAL COOPERATION
user II is fully cooperative user II is fully competing
(β = 0)
(
β = (2α−1)h+1
2
)
user I is fully cooperative
(α = 0)
1
2
log2
(
1 + 1
SNR−1
)
1
2
log2
(
1 + 1
SNR−1+
(1−h)
2
h
)
user I is fully competing(
α = (2β−1)h+1
2
) 12 log2 (1 + 1+h2SNR−1)+ 12 log2 (1 + 1−h2SNR−1+h) log2 (1 + 12SNR−1+ 1
2
h
)
For certain values of the payoff (determined by channel and SNR) in the interference game it might be the case
that each user can benefit from other players cooperation, and benefit even more from mutual cooperation. However
it is always the case that given cooperative strategy for the other player he always benefits from noncooperation
7with the others due to the water filling optimality (i.e. given the interference and noise PSD the best way to allocate
the power is through water filling which, as before mentioned, don’t take into account the influence on other users
thus cannot be considered as a cooperative method). In this situation the stable equilibrium is the mutual non-
cooperation. If on the other hand mutual cooperation is better for both users over mutual competition we obtain
that the stable point is suboptimal for both players. This is a well known situation in game theory termed the
Prisoner’s Dilemma [7] (here and after abbreviated PD). For a popular overview of the prisoner’s dilemma as well
as other basic notions in game theory as well as history of the subject we recommend [17].
A PD situation is defined by the following payoff relations - T > R > P > N , where:
• T (Temptation) is one’s payoff for defecting while the other cooperates. In our game choosing an IWF while
the other player uses FDM.
• R (Reward) is the payoff of each player where both cooperate or mutual choice of FDM.
• P (Penalty) is the payoff of each player when both defects or mutual use of IWF.
• N (Naive) is one’s payoff for cooperating while the other defects, i.e., the result of using FDM when the other
player uses IWF.
It is easy to show that the Nash equilibrium point in this case is that both players will defect (P ). This is caused
by the fact that given the other user act the best response will be to defect (since T > R and P > N ). Obviously
a better strategy (which makes this game a dilemma) is mutual cooperation (since R > P ).
In our symmetric interference game α and β can be viewed as the level of mutual cooperation. α determines the
level and cooperation of user I with user II, and β the level of cooperation of user II with user I. For analyzing
this game we can analyze the simplified discrete game. As before mentioned a PD situation is characterized by the
following payoff relations: T > R > P > N . By examining the relations between the different rates (payoffs) as
depicted in table I we can derive a set of conditions on h and SNR for which the given symmetric interference
channel game defines a PD situation:
(a) T > R:
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1+h
2
SNR−1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1−h
2
SNR−1 + h
)
>
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1
)
(16)
this equation reduces to h2 − 2 · h+ 1 > 0 which holds for every h 6= 1.
(b) T > P :
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1+h
2
SNR−1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1−h
2
SNR−1 + h
)
> log2
(
1 +
1
2
SNR−1 + 12h
)
(17)
simplifying the equation we obtain
SNR−2
(
h+
1
4
h2
)
+ SNR−1
(
1
2
h3 +
3
4
h2 +
1
4
h
)
+
(
1
16
h4 +
1
8
h3 +
1
16
h2
)
> 0 (18)
8since SNR and h are nonnegative the equation always true.
(c) R > P
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1
)
> log2
(
1 +
1
2
SNR−1 + 12h
)
(19)
simplifying (15) we get
h2 + 2hSNR−1 − SNR−1 > 0 (20)
since h is nonnegative the equation holds for h > hlim 1, where
hlim 1 = SNR
−1
(√
1 +
1
SNR−1
− 1
)
(21)
(d) R > N
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1
)
>
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1 + (1−h)2 h
)
(22)
which reduces to 1−h2 · h > 0, this equation holds for every 0 ≤ h < 1.
(e) P > N
log2
(
1 +
1
2
SNR−1 + 12h
)
>
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1 + (1−h)2 h
)
(23)
or equivalently
h3 + h2(0.5 + 2SNR−1)− 0.5h − SNR−1 < 0 (24)
since h is nonnegative the equation holds for h < hlim 2, where hlim 2 is the solution for (24) given by the cubic
formula. Another condition arises from the sum-rate perspective is the following - 2R > T + N . This condition
implies that a mixed strategy (i.e. one user is cooperating while the other competing) will not achieve higher sum
rate than mutual cooperation -
(f) 2R > T +N :
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1
)
>
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1+h
2
SNR−1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1−h
2
SNR−1 + h
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
SNR−1 + (1−h)2 h
)
(25)
which reduced to
SNR−2
(
6(1 − h2) + 8h
)
+ SNR−1(9h + h2) + 4h2(1− h) > 0 (26)
since h and SNR are nonnegative the equation is true in the relevant region of 0 ≤ h < 1 for every SNR.
Combining all the relation above we conclude that only three situation are possible:
• (A) T > P > R > N , for h < hlim 1
• (B) T > R > P > N , for hlim 1 < h < hlim 2
• (C) T > R > N > P , for hlim 2 < h
9where hlim 1 and hlim 2 are given above.
The sum rate is either 2 ·R (when both applying FDM), 2 · P (when both using IWF) or T +N (when one uses
IWF while the other applying FDM). Examining the achieved sum rate for the two strategies (IWF and FDM)
yields the following: The payoff relations in (A) corresponds to a game called ”Deadlock”. In this game there is
no dilemma, since as in the PD situation, no matter what the other player does, it is better to defect (T > R and
P > N ), so the Nash equilibrium point is P . However in contrast to PD, in this game P > R thus there is no
reason to cooperate. The maximum sum rate is also P because 2 · R > T + N and P > R. Since applying the
IWF strategy equals to P (by our definition of competition), this is the region where the IWF algorithm achieves
the maximum sum rate as well as optimal rate for each user.
The payoff relations in (B) corresponds to the above discussed PD situation. While the Nash equilibrium point
is P , the maximum sum rate is achieved by R. In this region the FDM strategy will achieve the maximum sum
rate.
The last payoff relations (C) corresponds to a game called ”Chicken”. This game has two distinguished Nash
equilibrium points, T and N . This is caused by the fact that for each of the other player’s strategies the opposite
response is preferred (if the other cooperates it is better to defect since T > R, while if the other defects it is better
to cooperate since N > P ). The maximum rate sum point is still at R (since R > P and 2 · R > T + N ) thus,
again FDM will achieve the maximum rate sum while IWF will not.
An algorithm for distributed power allocation can be derived from this insight for the symmetric interference
game. Given a symmetric interference game (i.e. a symmetric channel matrix and SNR), if h < hlim 1 (where
hlim 1 is given in (21)) use the IWF method to allocate the power, else, both players should use the FDM method.
Since the channel crosstalk coefficient h is assumed to be known to both users this algorithm can be implemented
distributively (with pre agrement on the band used by each user for the FDM). We will return to this strategy in
the context of real DSL channels in section V
It is important to distinguish between the continuous symmetric interference game and the discrete one. Even
though the discrete game can have Nash equilibrium other than α = β = 12 (as we saw in the chicken game)
these equilibrium points are not stable in the continuous game. Hence we are left with only one stable equilibrium
as proven in (3.1). Nevertheless, our conclusions regarding the benefit of cooperation in the interference game
derived from the discrete game remains valid in the continuous one since once continuous strategies are chosen
they inevitably lead to α = β = 0.5. However when players choose to cooperate the stability issue is not important
since IWF is not used. Further discussion and examples of the prisoner’s dilemma in this case can be found in
[20].
IV. THE NEAR-FAR PROBLEM
One of the most important spectral coordination problems in the DSL environment is the near-far problem. This
problem has similarity to the power control problem in CDMA network. However the DSL channel is frequency
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selective (see Figure 2(b)) and multi-carrier modulation is typically used. Therefore the interference from remote
terminal to CO based services is very severe and has properties similar to near end crosstalk (NEXT). This scenario
is typical to unbundled loop plants where the incumbent operator is mandated by law to lease CO based lines to
competitive operators. Figure 2(a) describes a typical near far interference environment.
The problem has also appeared in the upstream direction of VDSL (which is at frequencies above 3MHz). The
solution of the VDSL standard is highly suboptimal since the optimization has been done for fixed services under
specific noise scenarios. It has been shown that upstream spectral coordination can lead to significant enhancement
of upstream rates in real life environments. While DSL channels have relatively complicated frequency response and
full analysis is possible only based on computer simulations and measured channels, we provide here an analysis
of a simplified near far scenario that captures the essence of distributed cooperation in near far scenarios. In section
VI we will provide simulated experiments on measured channels.
The analysis in this section is divided into two parts. First a simple symmetric bandwidth near-far game with
no option to partition the bands is analyzed and it is proved that an FDM solution is optimal. Then the results are
extended to a more general situation with asymmetric bandwidth. In this case we show that a solution minimizing
the interference by utilizing only part of the band is preferable to a global FM-IWF. This is done by providing
analytic bounds on the rate region for both strategies. Unlike all previous analysis of these strategies we are able
to provide analytic bounds on the rate region.
A. Symmetric two bands Near-Far problem
Consider the case of two users using two bands with channel matrices given by
|H(1)|2 =

 α β
γ 1

 , |H(2)|2 =

 0 δ
ε 1

 (27)
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where H(1) and H(2) are the normalized channel matrices for each frequency band. Note that the second band
can be used only by the second user which will be termed the strong user. Furthermore we assume that the first
band can be used partly by the second user if he chooses a non-naive FDM or non-naive TDM strategies. The first
user will be called the weak user. To simplify the discussion we make the following assumptions:
• Both users have transmit power limitation P . This is not essential but simplifies notation.
• α << 1 This is the reason that we refer to the first user as the weak user.
• Ni is the additive Gaussian noise is constant for both receivers and at both bands. This assumption is reasonable
since the design of all multi-carrier modems requires low modem noise floor in order to support the high
constellations.
• Ni << βP This means that the weak user is limited by the crosstalk from the strong user.
• γP << Ni << 0.5P . Typically the weak lines emerging from the CO generate crosstalk that is negligible
into the RT line. This means that basically the strong user sees the same signal to noise ratio across the two
bands. This is actually better for the weak user than the real situation where the strong user observes better
SNR on the first band. The second inequality suggest that we work in the bandwidth limited high SNR regime,
which is the interesting case for DSL networks.
• User II can perform a voluntary power backoff τ .
Under our assumptions user II completely dominates the achievable rate of user I, and user I has no way to force
anything on user II. This type of game is called “The Bully” game, where the strong user can decide to behave in
any manner. We would like to analyze the benefits of a “polite bully” that takes whatever it needs, but behaves as
polite as possible to other users, by allowing them to use resources he does not need.
To that end we analyze the capacity region of the two users under water-filling strategies and under interference
minimization strategy of the second user, where the strong user utilizes only partially the joint resource which is
the first band. Note that all the strategies are purely distributed since only the agreement to behave politely by the
bully player is required. We make several observations regarding the possible strategies:
Claim 4.1: The weak user will always use all its power in the first band.
This claim follows from the fact that user I has no capacity in the second band.
Let the power allocation of user II be (P1, P2) such that P1 + P2 = P .
Claim 4.2: The rate achievable by user I is given by
C1 = log2
(
1 +
αP
βP1 +N1
)
This claim is implied by our assumptions of Gaussian signalling by both users and independent detection of each
user. Typically for the DSL interference channel, the interference to AWGN ratio is insufficient for successive
interference cancelation so each user should treat the other users interference as Gaussian noise. It is now easy to
compute the optimal rate adaptive strategy for user II.
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Claim 4.3: The power allocation for user II under politeness factor τ is given by
P1 =
P
2 (τ − γ) P2 =
P
2 (τ + γ) (28)
The proof for claim 4.3 follows the same lines as the proof of claim 3.1. The WF solution suggests a constant level
of the transmitted power + noise (which includes the interference) for each band. In our case this implies that
P1 +N2 + γP = P2 +N2 (29)
since P1 + P2 = τP we can rewrite the equation as
2P1 + γP = τP. (30)
Solving for P1 we obtain P1 = P2 (τ − γ) and P2 =
P
2 (τ + γ) We now obtain the rate for user II.
Claim 4.4: The rate of user II under FM-IWF with power backoff τ is given by:
C2 = log2
(
1 +
P1
N2 + γP
)
+ log2
(
1 +
P2
N2
)
(31)
where P1 and P2 are given by (28).
An alternative approach for user II can be to minimize the interference to the first band by increasing the power
in the second band should it find it useful. This leads to different expression for the capacity region.
The expression for the capacities using the cooperative act of user II have the same form as before
C1 = log2
(
1 + αP
N1+βP˜1
)
C2 = log2
(
1 + P˜1N2+γP
)
+ log2
(
1 + P˜2N2
) (32)
Where (P˜1, P˜2) is the new power allocation of user II such that P˜1 + P˜2 = τ˜P
In order to find the (P˜1, P˜2) we need to choose the minimal P˜1 such that the following equation holds
log2
(
1 +
P1
N2 + γP
)
+ log2
(
1 +
P2
N2
)
= log2
(
1 +
P˜1
N2 + γP
)
+ log2
(
1 +
P˜2
N2
)
(33)
where P1, P2 are defined by (28). It is clear that in order to minimize P˜1 we need to set τ˜ to 1. By doing so we
enable user II to allocate the maximum amount of power on the second band and therefor minimize the power on
the first band. Substituting P˜2 with P − P˜1 and solving (33) for P˜1 we get
P˜1 =
1
2
P (1− γ)±
1
2
[P (1− τ)(P + 4N2 + 2γP + Pτ)]
1
2 (34)
Using the minimal solution for P˜1 and applying some algebra on the expression above we obtain
P˜1 =
1
2
P (1− γ)−
1
2
[
P 2(1− τ)2
(
1 + 4N2/P + 2γ + τ
1− τ
)] 1
2 (35)
which can be rewritten as
P˜1 =
1
2
P (1− γ)−
1
2
P (1− τ)
(
1 + 4N2/P + 2γ + τ
1− τ
) 1
2
(36)
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Since the term
(
1+4N2/P+2γ+τ
1−τ
)
is grater or equal to 1 the square root of this term is also grater or equal to 1. We
can write
1 + ∆ =
√
1 + 4N2/P + 2γ + τ
1− τ
where ∆ is some positive constant. Therefore we can write
P˜1 =
1
2
P (1− γ)−
1
2
P (1− τ)(1 + ∆) (37)
arranging (37) we get
P˜1 =
1
2
P (τ − γ)−
1
2
P (1− τ)∆ (38)
which, by claim 4.3 becomes
P˜1 = P1 −
1
2
P (1− τ)∆ (39)
If the value of P˜1 as given in (39) is negative we should fix it to zero. This is the best situation for user I as he
sees no interference at all.
Since C2 is equal for both methods (guaranteed by (33)) and P˜1 ≤ P1 (i.e. the interference that user I sees using
the cooperative method is less than or equal to the one obtained by FM IWF) we conclude that the rate region
achieved using the cooperative act contains the rate region related to FM IWF.
B. Near-Far problem in the bandwidth limited case
Our next step will be to extend the analysis above to the case where the two bands have non-identical bandwidth,
and we work in the bandwidth limited regime, i.e., the spectral efficiency of the transmission is higher than 1 (we
transmit more than 1 bit per channel use). In this case the signal to noise ratio at each receiver is positive. This
will capture a more realistic ISI limited channel similar to the DSL channel. We shall restrict the analysis to flat
attenuation in each band.
Assume that the first band has bandwidth W1 and the second band has bandwidth W2. Similarly to the previous
case assume that the channel matrices at each band are given by (27).
To simplify the expressions we shall also assume that γP << N2Wi, where N2 is the PSD of the AWGN of
the second user receiver. This is realistic in typical near far problems in DSL where the FEXT from the CO lines
into the RT lines is negligible compared to the AWGN due to the strong loop attenuation of lines originating at
the CO. Under our assumptions we prove the following:
Theorem 4.1: The rate region of the FM-IWF satisfies
W1 log2

1 + αP
βP
(
2
R2
W1+W2
−1
)
/ ¯SNR2 +W1N1

 ≤ R1 ≤W1 log2

1 + αP
βP
(
2
R2
W1+W2
+1
)
/ ¯SNR2 +W1N1


(40)
where ρ = W1W1+W2 and
¯SNR2 =
(
P
N2W1
)ρ ( P
N2W2
)1−ρ
(41)
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is a generalized geometric mean of the SNR at the two bands.
The capacity of the two users is now given by1:
C1 = W1 log2
(
1 + αPN1W1+βP1
)
C2 = W1 log2
(
1 + P1N2W1+γP
)
+W2 log2
(
1 + P2N2W2
) (42)
where again P1 + P2 = τP . To determine τ assume that the target rate of the bully player is R2 and ignore γP
by our assumption. Therefore IWF results in flat transmit PSD for user 2:
P1 = ρτP
P2 = (1− ρ)τP
We require that
R2 = W1 log2
(
1 +
ρτP
N2W2
)
+W2 log2
(
1 +
(1− ρ)τP
N2W2
)
(43)
Therefore we obtain
R2 ≥W1 log2
(
ρτP
N2W1
)
+W2 log2
(
(1− ρ)τP
N2W2
)
(44)
Actually using the high SNR approximation we can replace the inequality by approximate equality. Hence
2R2 ≥
(
ρτP
N2W1
)W1 ((1− ρ)τP
N2W2
)W2
(45)
Hence
2
R2
W1+W2 ≥
(
ρτP
N2W1
)ρ ((1− ρ)τP
N2W2
)1−ρ
(46)
Further simplification yields
2
R2
W1+W2 ≥
τP
N2W
ρ
1W
1−ρ
2
ρρ(1− ρ)(1−ρ) (47)
Therefore
τ ≤
2
R2
W1+W2
¯SNR2ρρ(1− ρ)(1−ρ)
(48)
Also note that since 0 < ρ < 1
1
2
≤ ρρ(1− ρ)(1−ρ) ≤ 1
hence
τ ≤
2
R2
W1+W2
+1
¯SNR2
(49)
Substituting (49) into (42) we obtain that the rate for user I is bounded by
R1 ≤W1 log2

1 + αP
βP
(
2
R2
W1+W2
+1
)
/ ¯SNR2 +W1N1

 (50)
This is indeed very satisfying. As we know the bully’s power backoff is determined by the required spectral
efficiency R2/(W1 +W2) and the geometric mean SNR of the bully player. Also note that no matter how good
1We will analyze capacity only so the Shannon gap is Γ = 1 (other gaps can be treated similarly with just an extra term Γ).
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the SNR of user II on the second band, the FM-IWF always incurs a loss to user I’s capacity, since there is always
additional disturbance in the first band. The total rate can be rewritten as
R1 ≤W1 log2
(
1 +
α
β
(
2R2/(W1+W2)+1
)
¯SNR−12 +W1SNR−11
)
(51)
and it is always lower than the rate of interference free situation. On the other hand if the rate of user II satisfies
R2 ≤W2 log2
(
1 +
P
W2N2
)
an FDM strategy will achieve for user I a rate
R1 = W1 log2
(
1 +
α
W1SNR
−1
1
)
(52)
which is always higher than the right hand side of (51).
When the signal to noise ratio of user II is positive (BW limited case) we can also obtain a lower bound on the
achievable rate of user I. Similarly to the previous case we obtain a lower bound on the rate of user I given a rate
R2 for user II. The proof is similar. Start with (43) and note that when
τP
N2(W1 +W2)
≥ 1 (53)
we have
R2 ≤W1 log2
(
2ρτP
N2W1
)
+W2 log2
(
2
(1− ρ)τP
N2W2
)
(54)
since 1 + x < 2x for x > 1 and since (53) drags ρτPN2W1 ≥ 1 and
(1−ρ)τP
N2W2
≥ 1. Similar derivation now yields
τ ≥
2
R2
W1+W2
−1
¯SNR2
(55)
Which leads to a lower bound on R1
R1 ≥W1 log2

1 + αP
βP
(
2
R2
W1+W2
−1
)
/ ¯SNR2 +W1N1

 (56)
This provides good lower and upper bounds on the rate region as a function of the channel parameters. As noted
for high SNR scenarios the upper bound on τ (48) is tight, which provides accurate estimate of the rate region.
This ends the proof of theorem 4.1.
We now provide similar bounds on the rate region of a dynamic FDM, where the bully minimizes the fraction
of the first band that he uses.
Theorem 4.2: The rate region of a dynamic FDM strategy where given a rate R2 the strong player minimizes
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the fraction of the first band he uses is bounded by
R1 ≤ (1− λmin)W1 log2

1 + αP
(
1+λminW1
1
λminW1+W2
)
N1


+ λminW1 log2

1 + αP
(
1−(1−λmin)W1
1
λminW1+W2
)
N1+β
P
λW1+W2


R1 ≥ (1− λmax)W1 log2
(
1 +
αP
(
1+λmaxW1
1
λmaxW1+W2
)
N1
)
+ λmaxW1 log2
(
1 +
αP
(
1−(1−λmax)W1
1
λmaxW1+W2
)
N1+β
P
λW1+W2
)
(57)
where
λmin =
R2
log2(1+
SNR2
W2
)
−W2
W1
λmax =
R2
log2(1+
SNR2
(W1+W2)
)
−W2
W1
(58)
The proof of this theorem is given in appendix B.
V. THE DYNAMIC FDM COORDINATION ALGORITHM
DSL channels have typically higher attenuation at higher frequencies. (see figure 2(b)). A typical DSL topology
including CO and RT deployment is depicted in figure 2(a). As we can see the users of the RT are the Bully type
users which do not typically suffer interference from CO based lines, but do cause substantial interference to the
CO based lines.
Inspired by our analysis of cooperative strategies presented in the previous sections we propose a cooperative
solution for the near-far problem. The dynamic FDM (DFDM) algorithm, first presented in [21], allocates the power
of the near user not only as a function of the noise PSD on its own line (as the IWF does) but by minimizing the
use of the lower part of the spectrum. Since the far user can allocate its power only at the lower part of spectrum,
applying the DFDM on the far user power allocation reduces the level of interference to the far user by means of
orthogonal transmitting bands. The idea underlying the approach above is that the far user uses the lower part of
the spectrum (as explained above), and therefore use of this part of the spectrum should be minimized for the near
user. A variation of this method in the centralized level 2 DSM is the band preference method [23].
We define fc to be the cutoff frequency i.e. the minimal frequency used by the near user. The power allocation
method in the DFDM algorithm is as follows - given Rd the design rate of the remote terminal user, the RT
user allocates its power such that the rate achieved is equal to Rd along with maximizing fc. More precisely the
algorithm is implemented in two steps: At the first step the maximal fc is found (this step is performed by applying
RA-IWF at varying fc values). The second step is reducing the total power by applying FM-IWF on the upper part
of the spectrum determined by the former step. The implementation steps of the DFDM algorithm are summarized
in table II. When the signal to noise ratio is high we can replace the RA-IWF by computing the capacity based on
the measured noise profile (since for all RT based users the channel and crosstalk are approximately identical).
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Fig. 2. (2(a)) Loop topology of the Near-Far problem in DSL. (2(b)) Typical VDSL2 channel
TABLE II
DFDM IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE NEAR-FAR SCENARIO
1. Let Rd = preassigned target rate for the near user.
2. Estimate the received noise PSD.
3. find fc, the minimal f such that the near user can achieve rate Rd using frequencies above fc.
4. Allocate the minimal amount of power needed for achieving Rd using only frequencies grater than fc.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section we examine the rate region of the DFDM algorithm compared to FM-IWF. We have also simulated
the OSM method [18], [19] which is a DSM level 2 in order to have an upper bound on the performance of DSM
level 1 techniques. The channel transfer matrix is a measured binder provided by France Telecom research labs
[22]. The simulations global parameters are VDSL 998 band plan up to 12 MHz, a maximum power constraint of
30mW (15 dBm) and a white noise PSD of −140dBm/Hz. In addition the frequency Division Duplex (FDD)
998 bandplan is used. We have simulate two scenarios:
• Central office / Remote Terminal Downstream.
• Upstream with non-identical locations.
The first scenario represent downstream setup where a central office (CO) with 8× 3.6 km ADSL lines is sharing
a binder with a remote terminal (RT) with 8 × 0.9 km VDSL lines. The RT is located 2.7 km from the CO as
depicted in Figure 3(a). In the second simulation set we have studied upstream coordination. We have used two
clusters of VDSL users sharing the same binder transmitting to the same RT. The far group contained 8 lines
located 1.2 km from the RT while the near group contained 8 lines located just 600m from the RT, as depicted in
Figure 3(b). Since in the VDSL 998 bandplan the lowest US frequency is 3.75 MHz the near far problem is much
more pronounced than in ADSL.
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Looking at the DS scenario. The achieved rate regions of the three methods are depicted in Figure 4(a). We can
clearly see the advantage of the DFDM over the FM-IWF. The PSDs of the DFDM and the FM IWF methods
corresponding to a 60 Mbps service on the RT lines are shown on Figure 4(b). For this value of Rd there is no
overlap between the frequencies used by each cluster of users resulting in no interference to CO users from RT
users. This is the best case for the CO users since actually the near far problem has vanished and the achieved rate
of the average CO user is the same as the RT was not transmitting at all. Figure 5(a) shows the received SINR of
an average CO user for both methods. Its implies that for Rd for which fc is grater than the maximal frequency
used by the CO users the gain using DFDM has two factors. The first factor is that the DFDM’s SINR is grater
or equal (since there is no interference from the RT) than the FM IWF one. The second is that the CO users
available bandwidth is larger using DFDM than the FM IWF bandwidth. Both originate from the orthogonality
of the transmission bands and both factors have positive contribute on the achieved rate of the CO users. Where
Rd is close to the RT maximal achievable rate fc is getting smaller and the available bandwidth for the CO is
decreased. Figure 5(b) demonstrates this for Rd = 72 Mbps. This design rate is almost 0.93 · RRT,max and thus
even by applying DFDM the RT PSD occupies most of the low frequencies regime. This causes the bandwidth of
the CO users to decrease to 0.6 Mhz and in addition to a degradation in the SINR. As a consequence for this Rd
FM IWF achieves better rate for the CO users than DFDM. However as can be seen the difference is marginal.
Turning to the upstream scenario. Figure 6 depicts the rate region achieved by the different DSM methods. Not
only the DFDM outperforms the FM IWF method in this scenario, the rate region obtained by the DFDM method
is very close to the upper bound given by a fully coordinated spectrum management using the OSM algorithm.
Moreover in this scenario the DFDM is better than or equal to the FM-IWF for all achievable rates of the strong
user.
8
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Fig. 3. (3(a)) CO/RT downstream setup. (3(b))Near-Far upstream setup
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the iterative water filling algorithm for several simple channels using game
theoretic techniques. We have shown that the IWF algorithm is subject to the prisoner’s dilemma by providing
explicit characterization of its rate region for these cases. Based on these insights we proposed a distributed
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Fig. 5. Average CO user received SINR for FM-IWF and DFDM for RT user at 60 Mbps (5(a) ) and 72 Mbps (5(b) ) .
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
rate region: 8 users at 1.2 km + 8 users at 0.6 km
Near users averge rate [Mbps]
Fa
r u
se
rs
 a
ve
rg
e 
ra
te
 [M
bp
s]
DFDM
FM−IWF
OSM
Fig. 6. Upstream - Comparison of the rate region for 8 Far users and 8 Near users using FM-IWF and DFDM.
20
coordination algorithm improving the rate region in near-far scenarios. Finally we have provided experimental
analysis of these two algorithms and the optimal centralized algorithm on measured channels.
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VIII. APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we prove that for every sequence of intervals {I1, . . . , Ik} ,the Gaussian interference game has
a Nash equilibrium point. Our proof is based on the technique of [5], (see also [6]), adapted to the water-filling
strategies in the game GI. While the result follows from standard game theoretic results, it is interesting to see the
continuity of the water-filling strategy as the reason for the existence of the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 8.1: For any finite partition {I1, . . . , Ik} a Nash equilibrium in the Gaussian interference game GI{I1,...,Ik}
exists.
Proof: For each player i define the water-filling function Wi(p1, . . . ,pN ) : B→Bi, which is the power distribution
that maximizes Ci given that for every j 6= i player j uses the power distribution pj subject to the power limitation
Pi. The value of Wi(p1, . . . ,pn) is given by water-filling with total power of Pi against the noise power distribution
composed of
Ni(k) =
1
|hi(k)|2

∑
j 6=i
|hij(k)|
2pj(k) + ni(k)

 (59)
where for all k, ni(k) > 0 is the external noise power in the k’th band.
Claim 8.1: Wi(x1, . . . ,xN ) is a continuous function.
Proof: We shall not prove this in detail. However informally this fact is very intuitive since small variations in
the noise and interference power distributions will lead to small changes in the waterfilling response. The proof of
theorem 8.1 now easily follows from the Brauwer fixed point theorem. The function W = [W1, . . . ,WN ] maps B
into itself. Since B is compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space W has a fixed point [p1, . . . ,pN ]T .
This means that
W([p1, . . . ,pN ]
T ) = [p1, . . . ,pN ]
T
By the definition of W this means that each pi is the result of player i water-filling its power against the interference
generated by {pj : j 6= i} subject to its power constrain . Therefore [p1, . . . ,pN ]T is a Nash equilibrium for
GI{I1,...,IK}.
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IX. APPENDIX B: BOUNDS ON THE RATE REGION OF DYNAMIC FDM
We can now obtain similar equations defining a dynamic FDM strategy, where the Bully uses the minimal
fraction λW1 of the first band to achieve R2. The main concept of this method is to minimize the interference to
the weak user. This translates to minimize λ for any given R2. As a consequence we will not apply any power
backoff (i.e. τ = 1) in order to maximize the power at the second band. The minimization of λ is done through
the maximization of the achieved rate for any given λ. Since the noise PSD is equal for both bands (recall that we
neglect the interference from the weak user at the first band) maximizing the rate is equal to waterfill the power
along a new single band channel with effective bandwidth of λW1 +W2 where λ is chosen such the following
equation holds
R2 = (λW1 +W2) log2
(
1 +
P
(λW1 +W2)N2
)
(60)
In order to get upper and lower bounds on R1 under the new strategy we can bound the total used bandwidth
W2 ≤ λW1 +W2 ≤W1 +W2 (61)
Thus we get
R2 ≤ (λW1 +W2) log2
(
1 +
P
W2N2
)
(62)
and we derive that λ ≥ λmin, where
λmin =
R2
log2(1+
SNR2
W2
)
−W2
W1
(63)
on the other hand
R2 ≥ (λW1 +W2) log2
(
1 +
P
(W1 +W2)N2
)
(64)
and similarly λ ≤ λmax, where
λmax =
R2
log2(1+
SNR2
(W1+W2)
)
−W2
W1
(65)
Recall that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, if for given R2 the obtained λ is grater than 1 this implies that the given rate doesn’t lie
in the achievable rate region of the bully. On the other hand a negative λ implies that the bully can achieve the
desired rate by the use of the second band solely (i.e. we will set λ to zero).
The rate of user I is achieved by water-filling in the first band. This results in
R1 = (1− λ)W1 log2
(
1 +
αP1,1−λ
(1− λ)W1N1
)
+ λW1 log2
(
1 +
αP1,λ
λW1N1 + βP1
)
(66)
In order to evaluate this expression we first need to find P1 which is user II power allocation at the band λW1.
Moreover we need to compute {P1,1−λ, P1,λ} the power allocation vector of user I. P1 is the power allocation at
the first band of a two bands channel with equal noise PSD and with no power backoff. We have seen above that
in this case we get P1 = ρ˜P where ρ˜ = λW1λW1+W2 hence
P1 =
λW1
λW1 +W2
P (67)
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P1,1−λ and P1,λ are the power allocation of user I along the two sub-bands at first band. Those parameters determined
by WF where we define the power level in each sub-band as P˜1,1−λ and P˜1,λ. Thus we have
P˜1,1−λ = P˜1,λ +
P1
λW1
(1− λ)W1P˜1,1−λ + λW1P˜1,λ = P
(68)
The first equation in (68) stands for the constant level of power + noise at each sub-band while the second equation
applies the total power constraint. solving (68) we get
P1,1−λ = (1− λ)W1P˜1,1−λ = P
(
(1− λ)W1 + λ(1− λ)W
2
1
1
λW1+W2
)
P1,λ = λW1P˜1,λ = P
(
λW1P − λ(1− λ)W
2
1
1
λW1+W2
) (69)
substituting (69) and (67) in (66) we get
R1 = (1− λ)W1 log2

1 + αP
(
1 + λW1
1
λW1+W2
)
N1

+ λW1 log2

1 + αP
(
1− (1− λ)W1
1
λW1+W2
)
N1 + β
P
λW1+W2

 (70)
Since the first sub-band (i.e. (1−λ)W1) is interference free it is clear that R1 is monotonically decreasing with λ.
Hence we can derive upper and lower bounds on the achieved rate R1 by substituting (63) and (65) respectively.
